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185 
THE FORBIDDEN CRYSTAL BALL: 
INTERPRETING “PROJECTED DISPOSABLE 
INCOME” FOR CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY 
PLANS AFTER BAPCPA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2005, “[a]fter nearly nine years of trying,” Congress finally 
passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA)1—“a modest corrective for the way the bankruptcy code ha[d] 
been exploited to allow virtually anyone to write down all his debts 
instead of repaying some portion of them.”2 BAPCPA’s champions had 
sought to curb consumers’ exploitation of bankruptcy’s privileges3 and to 
rein in a judiciary which had (allegedly) failed in its duty to police abuse.4 
Whether, as a matter of broad policy, BAPCPA has moved bankruptcy law 
in a positive direction is a matter of sharp contention5 and beyond this 
 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) (2005). 
 2. Editorial, Bankrupt—and Responsible, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at A20. See also infra note 
45 and accompanying text.  
 3. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 4. See infra note 42.  
 5. Indeed, among the legal community displeasure with BAPCPA ranges from annoyance to 
horror. As one commentator exclaims,  
From its Orwellian title, an example of deceptive advertising if ever there was one, to the last 
of its 512 pages, the bankruptcy bill recently passed by Congress presents numerous 
challenges to attorneys who represent consumer debtors. How such terrible legislation came 
to be passed by Congress is a story of money, political mean-spiritedness, and intellectual 
dishonesty . . . . There is no doubt that bankruptcy relief will be more expensive for almost all 
debtors, less effective for many debtors, and totally inaccessible for some debtors as a result 
of the new law. At the same time, other debtors, often the higher income individuals the bill 
was ostensibly aimed at, will find themselves better off than before because of [provisions] 
which can be turned to the debtor’s advantage . . . by the careful planning that only higher 
income debtors can afford. 
Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the 
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 
(2005). Frustration has also been vented from the bench: 
Those responsible for the passing of the Act did all in their power to avoid the proffered input 
from sitting United States Bankruptcy Judges, various professors of bankruptcy law at 
distinguished universities, and many professional associations filled with the best of the 
bankruptcy lawyers in the country as to the perceived flaws in the Act. This is because the 
parties pushing the passage of the Act had . . . . an agenda to make more money off the backs 
of the consumers in this country. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Act has been highly 
criticized across the country. In this writer’s opinion, to call the Act a “consumer protection” 
Act is the grossest of misnomers. 
In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).  
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Note’s inquiry. However, it is perhaps beyond debate that the 2005 
amendments are fraught with technical inconsistencies, vague language, 
and even bald mistakes.6  
While this thicket of unintended consequences provides numerous 
opportunities for interpretation and debate, this Note considers just one. 
Namely, by way of amending 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code,7 BAPCPA appears (under certain circumstances) to sanction lesser 
payments to creditors than would have been required under the prior law. 
This outcome—assuming it reflects a correct interpretation of the amended 
subsection8—betrays the proclamation by BAPCPA’s advocates that the 
law would “require[] people with the ability to repay their debts to actually 
repay those debts.”9  
This Note briefly covers the history, purpose, and function of Chapter 
13 bankruptcy protection and explains both how the specific subsection of 
Chapter 13 pertinent to this Note—§ 1325(b)—operated before BAPCPA 
and how it now operates. Next, I illustrate how the new law creates a 
conflict by apparently allowing certain Chapter 13 debtors to withhold 
more income from creditors than would have been allowable prior to the 
2005 Act. After highlighting a series of recent court decisions confronting 
the issue, I explain that the strict application of the new Code adopted by 
some of these courts is the correct approach under the law—
 
 
 6. Less than two years after the passage of the Act, BAPCPA’s glitches are already well 
chronicled. “The list of drafting errors and incomprehensible provisions grows every day as 
bankruptcy professionals digest BAPCPA. . . . There will be generations of ‘technical amendments.’” 
Hon. Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised, 24-7 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., Sept. 2005, at 70. In her symposium piece, Professor Jean Braucher collects specific examples of 
“typos, sloppy choices of words, hanging paragraphs, and inconsistencies” which occur in BAPCPA: a 
hanging paragraph and omission of the word “period” after “910-day”; skipping a subsection (k); 
“using two different words, ‘waiver’ and ‘exemption,’ to refer to being excused from obtaining credit 
counseling until after filing”; “using the phrase ‘with respect to’ four times and in the process keeping 
property of the estate, as opposed to property of the debtor, subject to the automatic stay”; “requiring a 
disclosure that ‘you will have to pay a filing fee . . .,’ even though there is a new provision for waiver 
of fees in BAPCPA”; and “applying [the] attorney certification requirement to schedules filed with a 
petition but apparently not to schedules filed after the petition.” Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the 
Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 93, 97 & nn.17–20 (2007). See also George H. Singer, The Year In Review: Case Law 
Developments Under The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention And Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 82 
N.D. L. REV. 297, 305–79 (2006) (summarizing sixty-one distinct consumer bankruptcy issues raised 
by BAPCPA as revealed by judges “who have been forced to make sense of the new law’s 
requirements”).  
 7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (2006) [hereinafter the “Code”]. For the purposes of this Note, any 
reference to a statutory section indicates Title 11 of the United States Code Annotated (2006), except 
where the 2000 version of the United States Code is explicitly referenced. The 2006 U.S.C.A. is cited 
because, as of this printing, the 2006 U.S.C. has not yet been officially published. 
 8. Differing interpretations are explored in Parts II.B.1, 2, infra.  
 9. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, 151 CONG. REC. S2459 (2005). See also infra note 38.  
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notwithstanding the admirable efforts of others straining to achieve more 
equitable results. Finally, I propose a rewording of the amended 
subsection which should benefit debtors, creditors, and the judiciary by 
removing ambiguity while respecting the intent of BAPCPA’s drafters.  
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Background 
1. Origins and Purpose of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy  
The power to create a national system of bankruptcy law is expressly 
conferred on Congress by the Constitution.10 Today, bankruptcy law is 
governed by the Bankruptcy Code11 which is contained in Title 11 of the 
United States Code pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.12 The 
Code is divided into various chapters;13 consumer bankruptcies are 
primarily governed by Chapters 7 and 13.14 Stated most simply, consumer 
 
 
 10. “The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.  
 12. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (Alan N. Resnick 
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th rev. ed., 2006). Prior to 1978 the Code principally operated according 
to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Id. The 1898 Act governed bankruptcy law for some 80 years; prior to 
that time bankruptcy statutes had been several and short lived. Id. The 2005 amendments are the most 
sweeping revision of the Bankruptcy Code since 1978; however, there have been more modest 
intervening revisions. See also Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333; Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-361, 106 Stat. 965; 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.  
 13. Nine chapters, to be precise. The first three chapters cover general provisions, case 
administration, and provisions common to the various forms of bankruptcy relief. See §§ 101–12, 301–
66, 501–62 (2006). The remaining six chapters govern specific relief schemes: Chapter 7 
“Liquidation,” §§ 701–84; Chapter 9 “Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality,” §§ 901–46; Chapter 11 
“Reorganization,” §§ 1101–74 (primarily for businesses, but see infra note 14); Chapter 12 
“Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with Regular Income,” §§ 1201–31; Chapter 
13 “Adjustments of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income,” §§ 1301–30; and Chapter 15 
“Ancillary and Other Cross Border Cases,” §§ 1501–32. Chapter 15 was added by BAPCPA, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, § 801(a), 119 Stat. 23, 134 (2005).  
 14. Since a consumer is not a municipality (Chapter 9), and unless they have a cross-border case 
(Chapter 15) or qualify for farmers’ or fishermen’s relief (Chapter 12), Chapters 7, 11, and 13 are the 
only relief schemes available to consumers under the Code. Chapter 11 is commonly associated with 
business bankruptcy; however, the Supreme Court has noted that while “the structure and legislative 
history of chapter 11 suggest that it was intended primarily to aid business debtors, the plain language 
of the statute allows individual debtors not engaged in business to proceed under chapter 11.” 7 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12,  ¶ 1100.02, citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 
(1991). Nevertheless, Chapter 11 is an exceedingly unpopular choice for consumers. For instance, in 
2003, scarcely more than one-twentieth of one percent of nonbusiness bankruptcies were Chapter 11 
cases. See Press Release, Federal Judiciary, Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, Business and 
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-
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bankruptcy relief erases most of a consumer’s debt after her property has 
been sold and the proceeds have been distributed to creditors (Chapter 
7),15 or after the consumer has completed a payment plan to creditors 
(Chapter 13).16 Whichever the scheme chosen, the underlying purpose of 
declaring bankruptcy is to take advantage of the “fresh start” that 
bankruptcy provides in order to be free from what might otherwise be a 
lifetime of subservience to inescapable debt.17 Chapter 13 effects this 
purpose by “facilitat[ing] adjustments of all types of debts of individuals 
with regular income through extension and composition plans funded out 
of future income, under the protection of the court.”18  
2. Chapter 13 Overview; Plan Components and Confirmation 
A debtor seeking protection and relief under Chapter 13 initiates the 
process by filing a petition with the court.19 Once the petition is filed, three 
important things happen: an automatic stay is effected,20 a bankruptcy 
 
 
Month Period Ending December 31, 2003 (Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/ 
1203f2.xls. 
 15. Chapter 7 “liquidation” bankruptcy provides for the sale of all a debtor’s “non-exempt” 
assets, with an orderly distribution of the proceeds to classified groups of creditors. See 6 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 700.01. All otherwise outstanding debt is discharged, subject to certain 
exceptions. Id. 
 16. In contrast to Chapter 7, Chapter 13 provides for a “payment plan” to creditors over time and 
does not require a debtor’s property to be liquidated. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, 
¶ 1300.01. Chapter 13 has the benefit of allowing debtors to keep their possessions, but has a more 
limited discharge than Chapter 7. Compare § 1328(a) with § 727(b).  
 17. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to “relieve the honest debtor from the 
weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations 
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.” This purpose of the act has been 
again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private interest, in that 
it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property 
which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future 
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 18. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 1300.02. 
 19. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301, FED. R. BANKR. P. 1002. Section 301 controls the initiation of bankruptcy 
proceedings under any chapter. § 301(a). With the petition, a debtor must submit various forms, 
schedules, and statements detailing financially relevant information such as assets, income, expenses, 
and debts. See generally § 521. Among these are Schedules I and J which detail current income and 
expenses, respectively. § 521(a)(1)(B)(ii). Schedules I and J are found on Official Bankruptcy Form 6. 
See also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 521.04. These schedules are important to the 
discussion under Part II.B, infra, of BAPCPA’s changes to § 1325(b) and the conflict caused by these 
changes.  
 20. § 362. The “automatic stay” operates from the moment of the filing of a petition, and 
generally prohibits any debt collection action by any creditor against the debtor. § 362(a). This 
prohibition is broad and strict, though limited exceptions may apply. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 12, ¶ 362.03; 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/5
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estate is created,21 and a trustee is appointed.22 The job of the trustee is to 
mediate the bankruptcy process by working closely with creditors, the 
debtor, and the court to ensure that the plan is administered fairly for all 
interested parties.23 For a Chapter 13 petitioner, a payment plan must be 
filed contemporaneously with the petition.24 Generally, the plan will lay 
out proposed monthly payments to creditors25 as well as a commitment 
period—the period of time over which these payments will be made.26  
A debtor’s Chapter 13 plan will have a substantial impact on 
creditors,27 few of which, if any, will receive the full value of their 
claims.28 Section 1325 therefore contains several provisions safeguarding 
creditors’ interests, such as the “good faith,”29 “best interests,”30 and “best 
efforts”31 tests. This Note focuses on the third.32  
 
 
 21. § 541(a). Loosely, the bankruptcy estate consists of everything a debtor owns at the time of 
filing. Id. In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee will generally control that property. § 363. But while a 
Chapter 13 debtor’s property is technically within the bankruptcy estate, the debtor is permitted to 
retain possession and control of it. § 1303.  
 22. § 1302.  
 23. Id. Some courts have a “standing trustee” appointed by the United States trustee. § 1302(a). 
“Otherwise, the United States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person to serve . . . .” Id. In 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the trustee will typically receive all of a debtor’s income during the plan 
period and distribute the proceeds to the debtor and creditors. See § 1322(a)(1). The court opinions 
discussed in Part II.B, infra, generally follow from objections made by trustees to a debtor’s proposed 
payment plan.  
 24. § 1321; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015.  
 25. Holders of “priority” claims must be paid in full before general unsecured creditors. 
§ 1322(a)(2). See § 507 for a listing and description of priorities.  
 26. Plans may not exceed five years. See § 1322(d). A debtor with income below the state 
median income cannot have a plan longer than three years unless the court, “for cause, approves a 
longer period, but the court may not approve a period that is longer than 5 years.” § 1322(d)(2)(C).  
 27. For better or worse, a confirmed Chapter 13 plan “bind[s] the debtor and each creditor, 
whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor 
has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.” § 1327(a).  
 28. With secured creditors, a debtor may “cram down” a payment plan which reduces the 
creditor’s allowance to the value of the collateral securing the claim, even if the claim exceeds the 
collateral’s value. See § 1325(a)(5)(B); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 1325.06.  
 For unsecured creditors, claims typically receive only pennies on the dollar. See, e.g., Scott F. 
Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection 
in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 430 (1999) (demonstrating in a late 1990s sample 
that unsecured creditors received only 15.2 percent of their claims in Chapter 13 plans). While 
creditors will necessarily be better off than if the debtor had filed for Chapter 7 (see infra note 30), 
creditors and trustees are nonetheless keenly interested in ensuring a debtor’s plan provides for the 
maximum payment possible.  
 29. Section 1325(a)(3) requires that a plan be “proposed in good faith and not by any means 
forbidden by law.” See also 8  COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 1325.04.  
 30. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 1325.05. Section 1325(a)(4) expressly 
requires that a creditor not be worse off under the Chapter 13 plan than it would be under a Chapter 7 
liquidation. 
 31. Collier describes this requirement as the “ability-to-pay” test. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 12, ¶ 1325.04. But see, e.g., Villanueva v. Dowell, 274 B.R. 836, 840 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The best efforts test is codified at § 1325(b). Section 1325(b)(1) 
provides in pertinent part:  
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to 
the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the 
plan unless . . . (B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's 
projected disposable income . . . will be applied to make payments 
to unsecured creditors under the plan.33 
Immediately prior to the 2005 amendments, the “disposable income” 
referred to above was defined by § 1325(b)(2) as “income . . . which is not 
reasonably necessary to be expended [on costs of living].”34 Because the 
pre-BAPCPA code did not otherwise define “income” or “expenses,” 
these were presumed to be the actual, to-date monthly income and 
expenses reported by the debtor to the court on Schedules I and J.35 The 
term “reasonably necessary” was also not defined by the Code.36 
Therefore, prior to BAPCPA, if a trustee or creditor objected that a debtor 
had violated §§ 1325(b)(1)(B), (b)(2) because the debtor’s listed expenses 
 
 
(“[Section 1325(b)] is commonly referred to as the ‘best efforts’ test.”).  
 32. The “best interests” test (see supra note 30) is fairly straightforward and is not relevant to 
this Note. However, the “good faith” provision is in fact important to the construction of the post-
BAPCPA “best efforts” test and will be revisited in Part II.B.1 below. See infra notes 107–09 and 
accompanying text.  
 33. § 1325(b)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection 1325(b)(1)(A) provides in the alternative that a 
debtor may avoid forfeiting all of her disposable income if she pays her debts in full. The best efforts 
test was added to the Code by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333, 356. The only alteration of § 1325(b)(1)(B) made by the 2005 
amendments is that the current phrase “applicable commitment period” replaces the phrase “three year 
period.” BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 318(2), 119 Stat. 23, 93 (2005). That change does not affect 
the law that is the focus of this Note.  
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). Prior to BAPCPA, subsection 1325(b)(2) 
provided in its entirety:  
For purposes of this subsection, “disposable income” means income which is received by the 
debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended— 
 (A) For the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, including 
charitable contributions (that meet the definition of “charitable contribution” under section 
548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as that term is defined 
in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of the gross income of the debtor 
for the year in which the contributions are made; and  
 (B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for 
the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business. 
Id.  
 35. See, e.g., In re Miller, 361 B.R. 224, 226 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007) (“Prior to the bankruptcy 
amendments, Schedules I and J were the primary source of evidence used to satisfy the disposable 
income test under § 1325(b).”). See also note 19, supra, for an explanation of these documents. 
 36. See In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 797 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (“What is ‘reasonably necessary’ 
is a question of fact for which the outcome can vary from judge to judge and jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/5
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were not “reasonably necessary,” the court brought its own subjective 
judgment to bear on these disputed items.37 
3. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 
On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) into law. 
The law was ostensibly enacted to correct widespread abuse of the 
bankruptcy system by irresponsible debtors.38 Upon signing, the President 
declared,  
In recent years, too many people have abused the bankruptcy laws. 
They've walked away from debts even when they had the ability to 
repay them. . . . The bill I sign today helps address this problem. 
Under the new law, Americans who have the ability to pay will be 
required to pay back at least a portion of their debts.39 
Prior to BAPCPA, the Code gave bankruptcy judges the discretion to 
dismiss Chapter 7 cases (or force Chapter 7 petitioners into a Chapter 13 
payment plan) if granting the debtor relief “would be a substantial abuse” 
 
 
 37. “Individual judges’ normative beliefs concerning how much a debtor should be required to 
sacrifice [were] found in every substantial abuse decision.” Harriet Thomas Ivy, Note, Means Testing 
Under The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999: A Flawed Means to a Questionable End, 17 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 221, 241 (2000). See, e.g., In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018, 1022 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) 
(holding that Corvette payments amount to “pampering [the debtor’s] own psyche at the expense of 
her unsecured creditors”); In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (boat payments are a 
luxury expense and are not reasonably necessary under § 1325(b)); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 467 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (holding that listed expenses falling outside the “reasonably necessary” 
standard included $500 per month for college tuition, $500 per month for secondary school tuition 
(“particularly in view of the high quality public education available in this country”), $515 per month 
for food for a family of four, and a monthly mortgage payment of $989 (“well above the amount 
necessary to provide adequate housing for a family of four.”)); In re Festner, 54 B.R. 532, 533 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 1985) (“Additional pension plans and stock purchases may be a wise investment which 
enhance an individual’s financial security, but the debtor is not entitled to acquire them at the expense 
of unpaid creditors.”). See also Robert G. Drummond, Disposable Income Requirements under 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 MONT. L. REV. 423 (1996) (explaining the calculation of pre-
BAPCPA disposable income).  
 38. As Senator Orrin G. Hatch explained, “No responsible society can long countenance the open 
flouting and abuse of its laws. This bill, with its means test, will discourage . . . abusive filings by 
restricting access to chapter 7 liquidation by those with relatively high incomes. We should all stand 
behind a law that requires people with the ability to repay their debts to actually repay those debts.” 
151 CONG. REC. S2459 (2005). See also Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005).  
 39. Press Release, President George W. Bush, “President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, 
Consumer Protection Act” (Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/ 
20050420-5.html.  
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of the Code.40 This safeguard relied on a subjective judgment from the 
bench as to what constituted “abuse.”41 However, many in Congress, 
distrusting the judiciary’s sensibilities regarding the definition of abuse,42 
preferred instead to mechanize this standard with strict mathematical 
criteria.43 These criteria have come to be known as the “means test.”44 
After years of legislative haranguing,45 BAPCPA finally grafted the means 
test onto the Code in § 707(b).46  
 
 
 40. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).  
 41. Since “substantial abuse” was not defined by statute, the approaches taken by courts varied to 
some degree, but two factors were of paramount importance: a debtor’s ability to pay, and 
forthrightness. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 707.04. This formulation by the 
Sixth Circuit was typical:  
In determining whether [a debtor has committed “substantial abuse” according to § 707(b),] a 
court should ascertain from the totality of the circumstances whether he is merely seeking an 
advantage over his creditors, or instead is “honest,” in the sense that his relationship with his 
creditors has been marked by essentially honorable and undeceptive dealings, and whether he 
is “needy” in the sense that his financial predicament warrants the discharge of his debts in 
exchange for liquidation of his assets. Substantial abuse can be predicated upon either lack of 
honesty or want of need. 
Behlke v. Eisen, 358 F.3d 429, 434 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).  
 42. According to a House Judiciary Committee report, “The standard for dismissal—substantial 
abuse—is inherently vague, which has led to its disparate interpretation and application by the 
bankruptcy bench.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 12 (2005). In an earlier round of legislative debate, 
one pair of commissioners announced that  
a desperate need [exists] for changes in the Bankruptcy Code and its administration. . . . [T]he 
system lacks effective oversight or control over its integrity. Uncovering and penalizing 
abusive or fraudulent practices is haphazard, despite the duty of debtor and creditor attorneys, 
panel and Chapter 13 trustees, judges, U.S. trustees and bankruptcy administrators, and U.S. 
attorneys’ offices to maintain integrity. 
Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Chapter 5, Recommendations for Reform of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, at 2 (1997), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/24commvi.pdf. 
 43. See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 105, 119 (1999) (noting that an earlier legislative draft of stricter bankruptcy controls 
created “an algorithm purposefully designed to limit judicial discretion on the issue of consumer 
debtor abuse”). See also Jensen, supra note 38.  
 44. See, e.g., 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 707.05. 
 45. See Jensen, supra note 38 (detailing the evolution and various incarnations of the BAPCPA 
amendments from 1994 to 2005). The means test was hotly contested. Prior to BAPCPA’s passage, 
Senator Richard J. Durbin declared,  
 The way the law works now, bankruptcy judges have the authority and discretion to look 
at how much debt a person has and how they acquired the debt. Then the judge decides: Is 
this someone who is trying to game the system? Is this someone who has been dealt some 
hard blows in life? Is this debt brought on by buying a plasma screen television, or taking that 
cruise, or is it a desperate effort to pay doctors’ bills and buy groceries and not see the house 
foreclosed on?  
 The means test in this bill wipes out the judge’s discretion. The judge can’t look at a real 
person. The judge looks at numbers on paper. The means test isn’t really meant to screen out 
cheaters. There is already a provision in the law for that. It is designed to trip people up, add 
legal expenses, and force more families into chapter 13. 
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The means test functions by “presum[ing] abuse exists” according to 
the size of a debtor’s net income.47 In other words, if a debtor’s income48 
minus expenses49 is sufficiently large,50 the debtor can presumably afford 
to pay back some debt over time.51 Under the BAPCPA paradigm, 
therefore, allowing such a debtor to proceed with a Chapter 7 discharge 
(leaving unsecured creditors with next to nothing)52 would be an abuse of 
the system.53 Hence, if the abuse trigger is sprung, the debtor must proffer 
a Chapter 13 payment plan—or receive no relief at all.54  
While the specific mechanics of the § 707(b) means test are not 
germane to this Note, certain components of the net income calculation 
 
 
151 CONG. REC. S 1823 (2005).  
 46. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102, 119 Stat. 23, 27–32 (2005) (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 707(b)). With the addition of the means test, § 707(b) increased from 156 words pre-BAPCPA to 
2,459 words after the amendments.  
 47. Specifically, § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) provides,  
In considering . . . whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this 
chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced 
by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less 
than the lesser of—(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or 
$6,575, whichever is greater; or (II) $10,950.  
 48. Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) specifies that the starting point is “current monthly income.” This in 
turn is defined by § 101(10A) as a debtor’s six-month pre-petition average income. See also infra note 
63 and accompanying text.  
 49. Generally, expenses include living expenses (§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)), payments on secured debts 
(§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)), and payments on priority claims (§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iv)). 
 50. See supra note 47.  
 51. “[M]eans testing has a simple purpose: to measure the ability of Chapter 7 debtors to repay 
debt and then, if they have sufficient debt-paying ability, to make them repay at least some of their 
debt—likely through Chapter 13—in order to receive a bankruptcy discharge.” Hon. Eugene R. 
Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 231 (2005).  
 52. “Unless they hold a nondischargeable claim or can somehow pressure the debtor to reaffirm, 
[unsecured creditors] receive nothing in the overwhelming majority of all consumer chapter 7 cases in 
which the debtors have no unencumbered, non-exempt assets.” Scott F. Norberg, Consumer 
Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 424–25 (1999). By comparison, Chapter 13 is much more preferable 
for unsecured creditors. See id. (describing a study showing a 15.2 percent return to unsecured 
creditors under Chapter 13 plans).  
 53. See Wedoff, supra note 51, at 236 (noting that under the post-BAPCPA regime, “ability to 
repay debt, standing alone, is sufficient to establish abuse”).  
 54. If granting Chapter 7 relief would be an “abuse,” “the court . . . may dismiss [the] case . . . or, 
with the debtor’s consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title . . . .” 
§ 707(b)(1). While Chapter 11 is technically an option for consumers, it is exceedingly unpopular for 
nonbusiness bankruptcy. See supra note 14.  
 The means test comes with a few caveats. For instance, § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) provides special 
circumstances which may allow a debtor to overcome the presumption of abuse. Additionally, debtors 
who fall below the median income level for their locality are exempt from the means test. 
§ 707(b)(7)(A). However, these below-median debtors will still be subject to a limited review for 
abuse according to good faith standards and the “totality of the circumstances.” See §§ 707(b)(1), (3), 
(6). 
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within the means test are. In particular, § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) mandates that 
living expenses, which are to be deducted from income in means test 
calculations, be determined according to national and local tables of living 
expenses promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service.55 These expense 
tables are incorporated by reference into Chapter 1356 and significantly 
impact post-BAPCPA plan confirmations.57  
In addition to codifying the means test in Chapter 7, BAPCPA made 
several major alterations to Chapter 13.58 These changes included two 
important adjustments to the Chapter 13 best efforts test.59 First, a debtor’s 
“current” income is no longer the actual current net income reflected by 
Schedule I.60 Post-BAPCPA § 1325(b)(2) now reads, “For purposes of this 
subsection, the term ‘disposable income’ means current monthly income 
received by the debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be 
expended . . . .”61 This change is significant when read in combination 
with BAPCPA’s new definition of “current monthly income” codified at 
11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). Paradoxically, § 101 requires that “current” 
 
 
 55. The drafters of BAPCPA, in search of a “uniform repayment standard, applicable like a 
rubber stamp to every family,” lighted upon the “National Standards” promulgated by the IRS. 
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 162 
(5th ed., Aspen Publishers 2006). These tables already existed for use in IRS negotiations with 
delinquent taxpayers, serving as a watermark for how much a consumer ought to be able to afford in 
tax repayment plans. Id. These tables are actively managed by the IRS, and are subject to change. Id. at 
163. For an interesting contention that use of the IRS National Standards in § 707(b)(2) may be 
unconstitutional, see Thomas E. Ray, Constitutionality of the Means Test: Does It Lack Uniformity?, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2005, at 6.  
 56. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.  
 57. See infra notes 83–89 and accompanying text for an illustration of the effect of this change. 
For above-median debtors, the means test under § 707(b) breaks expenses down into five categories, as 
summarized by the court in In re McGuire:  
(1) those that fit into the IRS’ National Standards, which include food, clothing, household 
supplies, personal care, and miscellaneous expenses; (2) those that fit into the IRS’ Local 
Standards, which include housing and transportation; (3) actual expenses for items 
categorized by the IRS as ‘Other Necessary Expenses,’ including such items as taxes, 
mandatory payroll deductions, health care, and telecommunication services; (4) actual 
expenses, with limitations, for certain other expenses specified by the Bankruptcy Code, such 
as care for disabled family members and tuition; and (5) payments on secured and priority 
debts. 
342 B.R. 608, 612 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006).  
 58. See, e.g., BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 102(g), (i), 106(c), 213(7)–(10), 219(d), 224(d), 
306(a), (b), 309(c), 119 Stat. 23, 33–35, 38, 53, 58, 65, 80, 83–84 (2005).  
 59. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for the language of the best efforts test, codified at 
§ 1325(b). Section 1325(b) was amended by BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h), 119 Stat. 23, 33 
(2005).  
 60. See supra note 34. Schedules I and J reflect the present, “actual” income and expenses of a 
debtor as of the date of their petition. 
 61. § 1325(b)(2) (emphasis added). See supra note 34 and accompanying text for the pre-
BAPCPA wording of § 1325(b)(2).  
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monthly income be measured exclusively by a debtor’s historical 
earnings62: it is all income (whether typical or not) received by the debtor 
during the six months preceding bankruptcy, divided by six.63 The debtor 
provides this calculation on Form B22C.64  
The second important change to the best efforts test is codified under 
new subsection 1325(b)(3). This provision stipulates that if a debtor’s 
income is above her locality’s median income, her “reasonable and 
necessary expenses” are to be determined according to the § 707(b) means 
test.65 Like the new current monthly income calculation, these expenses 
are provided by the debtor on Form B22C.66 This is an abrupt departure 
from the pre-BAPCPA practice of gleaning a debtor’s actual expenses 
from Schedule J67 and having a judge subjectively determine whether they 
are in fact “reasonably necessary.”68  
B. Post-BAPCPA Dilemma for Chapter 13 Plan Confirmation 
One court has aptly characterized the pre- and post-BAPCPA 
disposable income tests as the “crystal ball” and “rear view mirror” 
methods, respectively.69 In other words, since the pre-BAPCPA Code 
 
 
 62. “Although it has been correctly noted, borrowing from history’s judgment of the Holy 
Roman Empire, that [current monthly income] is not current, not really monthly, or necessarily 
income, Congress felt this was how income should be determined.” In re Kolb, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 
993, at *19 n.12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007).  
 63. Section 101(10A) specifically provides: “‘current monthly income’ . . . means the average 
monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor’s 
spouse receive) without regard to whether such income is taxable income, derived during the 6-month 
period [preceding the commencement of the case] . . . .” See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 12, ¶ 101.10A.  
 64. Official Bankruptcy Form 22C, Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of 
Commitment Period and Disposable Income (Chapter 13), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
BK_Forms_06_Official/Form_22C_0407.pdf [hereinafter Form B22C]. See also Form 22A, A 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, App. Pt. 2-562-67.  
 65. § 1325(b)(3). See supra note 57 for an explanation of means test expenses. Though it is not 
important to this Note, being above or below the applicable median income also determines the 
“applicable commitment period” for the plan. See also § 1325(b)(4); supra note 26.  
 The rationale for inserting the means test into the Chapter 13 plan confirmation process is not 
immediately clear from the legislative record. However, the general policy choice that led to inclusion 
of the means test in Chapter 7 presumably applied in the Chapter 13 context as well. See Marianne B. 
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is The Means Test The Only Way?, 13 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 667 (2005) (Congress imposed the means test on bankruptcy courts to 
prevent “each bankruptcy judge’s idiosyncratic views” from leading to disparate results, increased 
litigation, or a contravention of Congressional policy choices).  
 66. See supra note 64.  
 67. See supra note 34. However, Schedule J is still completed and submitted in addition to Form 
B22C. See supra note 19.  
 68. See supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text. 
 69. In re Guzman, 345 B.R. 640, 645 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).  
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focused on anticipated disposable income as informed by Schedules I and 
J, courts in effect looked to the future—as one would consult a crystal 
ball—to determine what a debtor could afford to pay in her plan. But with 
BAPCPA’s incorporation of historical figures as a basis for current 
monthly income70 (and with the use of static expense tables for above-
median debtors),71 courts applying § 1325(b) today consult a figurative 
rear view mirror instead. As noted above, the strictures of BAPCPA were 
professedly designed to compel increased payments to creditors (or at least 
to permit less abusive behavior by petitioning debtors).72 However, when 
put into practice, the post-BAPCPA rear view mirror approach has 
allowed some debtors to claim less disposable income (and thereby 
propose to pay less to creditors) than would have been permissible prior to 
the amendments. In fact, such debtors frequently propose to pay nothing at 
all.73 This seems inconsistent with the proclamation by BAPCPA’s 
advocates that, thanks to the 2005 Act, able debtors will be required to 
repay more of their debts.74 Some recent cases help illustrate the problem.  
The effect of the new current monthly income definition is aptly 
demonstrated by the facts of In re Kibbe.75 Upon filing her Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petition, petitioner Kibbe reported monthly earnings of 
$5,027.00 on her Schedule I.76 However, as it turned out, Kibbe had been 
involuntarily underemployed for most of the six months preceding her 
petition.77 As a result, her Form B22C showed a “current monthly income” 
of only $1,068.50.78 Kibbe also reported actual household expenses of 
$2,645.00 per month on Schedule J.79 Therefore, while she would have 
 
 
 70. The debtor’s six-month pre-petition average income. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1325(b)(2), 101(10A) 
(2006).  
 71. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(3) (2006); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 72. See supra notes 38–39, 43 and accompanying text.  
 73. See, e.g., In re Edmunds, 350 B.R. 636 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Rotunda, 349 B.R. 324 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Guzman, 345 B.R. 640 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).  
 74. See Henry E. Hildebrand, III, Unintended Consequences: BAPCPA and the New Disposable 
Income Test, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2006, at 54  (“It should come as no surprise that this dramatic 
and unrecognized impact of the evisceration of the disposable-income test has confounded the 
community of chapter 13 trustees.”); see also text accompanying supra note 39. 
 75. 342 B.R. 411 (Bankr. N.H. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Kibbe v. Sumski, 361 B.R. 302 (B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2007).  
 76. Id. at 413.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. Calculated as the average of the debtor’s income for the preceding six months according 
to §§ 1325(b)(2), 101(10A). This calculation was, of course, understated due to Kibbe’s intermittent 
employment.  
 79. Id. at 414. Because Kibbe was a “below-median” debtor (according to the $1,068.50 current 
monthly income calculation), means test expenses were not required to be incorporated under 
§ 1325(b)(3). Id. at 414 n.5. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text for an explanation of 
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shown $2,382.00 in disposable income before the 2005 amendments,80 
strictly applying the new current monthly income definition provided by 
BAPCPA would have resulted in a monthly position of negative 
$1,576.50.81 According to this construction, Kibbe argued that she did not 
have to pay anything to her unsecured creditors—even though she actually 
had plenty of extra money each month which she would have had to 
surrender before BAPCPA.82  
While Kibbe highlights the difficulty with strictly applying the post-
BAPCPA definition of income, In re Barr83 nicely frames the problem 
posed by BAPCPA’s alteration of the definition of expenses.84 Upon filing 
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, petitioner Barr proposed that the unsecured 
creditors to whom she owed $28,979.0085 be paid nothing—even though 
her actual disposable income was $513.00 (resulting from a Schedule I 
monthly income of $4,667.00 minus Schedule J expenditures of $2,529.00 
and proposed plan payments of $1,525.00).86 Barr claimed that she could 
rightfully withhold this income from her creditors because her Form B22C 
showed a current monthly income of $6,531.00 and allowable expenses 
per the IRS standards (since she was an above-median debtor)87 of 
$6,607.47, resulting in a disposable income of negative $76.47.88 In spite 
of the fact that the IRS standard expenses listed on Form B22C were more 
than two-and-a-half times Barr’s actual monthly expenses as revealed on 
Schedule J, the court confirmed the plan as submitted, leaving her 
unsecured creditors with nothing.89 
 
 
§ 1325(b)(3).  
 80. The court did not make this express calculation, but this figure results from subtracting 
Kibbe’s Schedule J expenses ($2,382.00) from Schedule I income ($5,027.00), which is how 
“disposable income” had been derived prior to BAPCPA. See supra note 35.  
 81. Again, the court did not expressly provide this calculation, but noted that subtracting 
Schedule J expenses ($2,645.00) from “current monthly income” on Form B22C ($1,068.50) “yields 
no ‘disposable income,’ as that term is defined in section 1325(b)(2).” Kibbe, 342 B.R. at 414.  
 82. Id. Specifically, Kibbe argued that the § 1325(b)(1)(B) requirement was satisfied by 
dedicating all of her disposable income (nothing) to unsecured creditors. Id. Ultimately, the court 
rejected this interpretation of the Code and denied Kibbe’s proposed plan, holding that “projected 
disposable income” under § 1325(b)(1)(B) should continue to be based on Schedules I and J rather 
than on “current monthly income” as defined by §§ 101(10A), 1325(b)(2). Id. at 415. The rationale 
employed by the Kibbe court and others with similar holdings is explored in Part II.B.1, infra. 
 83. 341 B.R. 181 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006).  
 84. See § 1325(b)(3). 
 85. Barr, 341 B.R. at 183.  
 86. Id. The court reported the $513.00 figure. However, this author’s math indicates that the 
court’s calculation is off by $100.00, i.e., the figures listed should net $613.00. This error is neither 
important to the conclusion of the court nor affects the usefulness of the case as an example herein. 
 87. § 1325(b)(3). See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
 88. Barr, 341 B.R. at 183. 
 89. Id. at 186.  
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From the time the BAPCPA amendments went into effect in October 
2005, many courts have been forced to confront the apparent irony of plan 
proposals such as those in Kibbe90 and Barr91: that the post-BAPCPA best 
efforts test sometimes sanctions lesser payments to creditors than did the 
prior practice of relying on Schedules I and J (notwithstanding the avowal 
of the Act’s proponents to create the opposite effect).92 The problem is 
particularly acute when debtors propose zero payments to unsecured 
creditors under the new law in spite of actually having surplus income.93 
But does BAPCPA really forbid the use of a “crystal ball,” forcing 
courts to close their eyes to a debtor’s immediate and future circumstances 
in favor of a “rear view mirror” perspective? As the cases gather, two 
distinct answers to this question emerge. Some courts have rejected zero-
payment plans like those in Kibbe and Barr, opting to interpret the Code in 
a way that preserves pre-BAPCPA practice and seems to align with 
Congressional intent.94 But others read the new Code more literally, 
 
 
 90. It is worth noting that creditors are not the only ones who can suffer from the effect of the 
“current monthly income” calculation. Debtors who have experienced a recent and dramatic drop in 
income may find themselves with an historical “current monthly income” average that far exceeds 
their present earnings. The result is that the only plan these debtors could confirm is one they cannot 
afford, as determined by a now-unrealistic historical average. See, e.g., In re Grady, 343 B.R. 747 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (debtor suffered a heart condition which prevented her from working, thereby 
bringing her actual income well below the “current monthly income” reported on Form B22C); In re 
Jass, 340 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (debtor incurred significant and unexpected medical 
expenses which greatly reduced his actual disposable income in contrast to his historically determined 
“statutory” disposable income).  
 91. The dilemma regarding § 1325(b)(3)’s incorporation of means test expenses has been 
deliberately simplified for the sake of the scope of this Note. Some cases concern the related, but more 
complex, problem of “double dipping.” This problem can arise when a debtor seeks to deduct 
“allowable expenses” under the means test from § 1325 disposable income notwithstanding the fact 
that the debtor makes no personal use of such expenses. For example, a debtor may seek to deduct car 
payments for a vehicle they do not in fact make payments on. See, e.g., In re McGuire, 342 B.R. 608 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). Or the debtor may try to continue to deduct an ownership expense for 
property they plan to surrender or sell. See, e.g., In re Edmunds, 350 B.R. 636, 640 n.2 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
2006). Some claim that the language of § 707(b) allows expenses such as mortgage payments to be 
deducted from disposable income twice. See, e.g., In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2006). Exploring the double dipping phenomenon requires a more detailed analysis of § 707(b) that is 
not essential to the resolution of this Note’s principal question: how to calculate disposable income 
under § 1325(b)(1)(B) after BAPCPA. 
 92. As noted by the court in In re Hardacre, “Congress’s intent with respect to the means test is 
well known to even the most casual bankruptcy practitioner. The means test was intended to ensure 
that those who can afford to repay some portion of their unsecured debts be required to do so.” 338 
B.R. at 725 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted).  
 93. See supra note 73.  
 94. See, e.g., In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007); In re Ward, 359 B.R. 741 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007); In re LaSota, 351 B.R. 56 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Edmunds, 350 
B.R. 636 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Risher, 344 B.R. 833 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006); In re Fuller, 346 
B.R. 472 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006); In re Grady, 343 B.R. 747 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); In re McGuire, 
342 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re Kibbe, 342 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006); In re Jass, 
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confirming plans of the same type.95 I call these the “liberal” and “strict 
textualist” approaches, respectively,96 and explain each in more detail 
below. 
1. The Liberal Interpretation of the Post-BAPCPA Code  
Despite the fact that, at first glance, the new § 1325 curtails judicial 
discretion and mandates that disposable income be calculated according to 
rigid formulae, some courts read the statute in a way that circumvents this 
result. Such courts often frame their interpretation of the Code by referring 
to either Congress’s intent in enacting BAPCPA, the general policy 
underlying bankruptcy law as a whole, or both.97 In order to align their 
holdings with the overall theme of the Act, these courts find that, in spite 
of BAPCPA’s apparent formalism, the language of Chapter 13 still 
permits substantially the same practices as before.  
Courts striving to achieve this result place great importance on the 
dueling phrases “disposable income” in § 1325(b)(2) and “projected 
disposable income” in § 1325(b)(1)(B).98 Principally, these courts argue 
that while § 1325(b)(2) now requires a strict, rearward-looking calculation 
 
 
340 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006); In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).  
 95. See, e.g., In re Miller, 361 B.R. 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007); In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494 
(Bankr. D. Utah 2007); In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006); In re Farrar-Johnson, 
353 B.R. 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Rotunda, 349 B.R. 324 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006); In re 
Guzman, 345 B.R. 640 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
2006); In re Barr, 341 B.R. 181 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). 
 96. This classification bisects the judicial response. But see Edmunds, 350 B.R. at 641–42 
(segmenting the approaches taken to post-BAPCPA § 1325 into three groups: “Mechanical 
Application of the Means Test,” “Means Test is Presumptively Correct,” and “Modified Means Test”). 
On the other hand, Professor Braucher characterizes the reaction from the bench to BAPCPA’s 
problems as “venting,” “nihilistic nitpicking,” “torturing the text,” and “subtle subversion.” Braucher, 
supra note 6, at 101–220.  
 97. See, e.g., Ward, 359 B.R. at 744 (“While acknowledging that Congress intended to take away 
discretion from the courts by enacting the means test, the bankruptcy courts in this district have held 
that a mechanical application of it in the context of plan confirmation often produces results that could 
not have been intended by Congress.”); Edmunds, 350 B.R. at 643 n.9 (arguing that Congress 
indicated in the legislative history that “‘the present bankruptcy system has loopholes and incentives 
that allow and sometimes even encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse.’ If the mechanical 
application of the Means Test controlled, without consideration of projected income and expenses, 
then there would be greater potential for ‘opportunistic personal filings.’”) (citation omitted); Jass, 340 
B.R. at 417 (“[I]f the Court were to . . . hold that a debtor must always pay unsecured creditors the 
number resulting from Form B22C, the Court would offend the ‘fresh start’ policies of the Code.”).  
 98. Emphasis added. The best efforts test under § 1325(b)(1)(B) requires a debtor to pay all 
“projected disposable income” to unsecured creditors in order to confirm a plan. See supra note 33. 
Section 1325(b)(2) defines “disposable income” “for the purposes of this subsection”; this would seem 
to control § 1325(b)(1)(B), but § 1325(b)(2) does not include the modifier “projected.” See supra text 
accompanying note 61.  
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of disposable income,99 this can have no effect on § 1325(b)(1)(B) because 
“projected” disposable income is necessarily forward-looking. As stated 
by the court in In re Jass:  
The Court must give meaning to the word “projected,” as it 
obviously has independent significance. The word “projected” 
means “[t]o calculate, estimate, or predict (something in the future), 
based on present data or trends.” Thus, the word “projected” is 
future-oriented. By definition under § 1325(b)(2), the term 
“disposable income” is oriented in historical numbers. By placing 
the word “projected” next to “disposable income” in 
§ 1325(b)(1)(B), Congress modified the import of “disposable 
income.” The significance of the word “projected” is that it requires 
the Court to consider both future and historical finances of a debtor 
in determining compliance with § 1325(b)(1)(B).100 
In addition to highlighting the importance of the word “projected,” 
courts have found textual authority for their forward-looking approach 
elsewhere in § 1325(b). For instance, the phrases “to be received” in 
§ 1325(b)(1)(B),101 “to be expended” in § 1325(b)(2),102 and “as of the 
effective date of the plan” in § 1325(b)(1)103 have all been read to indicate 
that Congress intended courts to consider the present and future financial 
status of a debtor without exclusively relying on historical data.104  
Courts following this liberal construction of the post-BAPCPA Code 
decline to factor the rearward-looking calculation of § 101(10A) into 
disposable income at all, effectively sidestepping the phrase “current 
monthly income” as added to § 1325(b)(2).105 This future-oriented 
 
 
 99. By including the new statutorily defined phrase “current monthly income” in the definition of 
“disposable income,” § 1325(b)(2) requires courts to examine a debtor’s preceding six months’ 
income. See supra notes 61, 63 and accompanying text.  
 100. 340 B.R. 411, at 415–16 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006). See also In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 723 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (“While Congress could have used the phrase ‘disposable income’ in section 
1325(b)(1)(B) and thereby invoked its definition as set forth in section 1325(b)(2), it chose not to do 
so. Consequently, Congress must have intended ‘projected disposable income’ to be different than 
‘disposable income.’”); In re Kibbe, 342 B.R. 411, 414 (Bankr. N.H. 2006) (“Had Congress intended 
‘projected disposable income’ to be synonymous with section 1325(b)(2)’s ‘disposable income’ 
Congress could have deleted the word ‘projected’ from section 1325(b)(1)(B) or defined ‘projected 
gross income,’ rather than only ‘disposable income,’ in section 1325(b)(2).”); accord In re Slusher, 
359 B.R. 290, 293–300 (Bankr. Nev. 2007); In re Edmunds, 350 B.R. at 643; In re Grady, 343 B.R. 
747, 750–51 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).  
 101. See supra text accompanying note 33 for the language of § 1325(b)(1)(B).  
 102. See supra text accompanying note 61 for the language of § 1325(b)(2).  
 103. See supra text accompanying note 33 for the language of § 1325(b)(1).  
 104. See, e.g., Edmunds, 350 B.R. at 644; Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 723.  
 105. See, e.g., In re Fuller, 346 B.R. 472, 485 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006) (“Whether a debtor is above 
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perspective has also been employed to justify a departure from the means 
test expenses and the overall disposable income reported on Form B22C; 
courts so holding generally view these figures as only presumptively 
correct.106  
In addition to extrapolating from the term “projected” that the current 
financial data revealed on Schedules I and J must continue to be used, 
some courts have seized upon the good faith qualification in 
§ 1325(a)(3)107 as another source of authority for this viewpoint.108 For 
instance, the court in In re LaSota opined that bankruptcy judges  
do “rough justice,” and need every statutory tool at their disposal to 
achieve it on a program-wide basis, though they might not achieve 
justice in every case. Congress’ retention of the “good faith” test, 
and the presence of the word “projected,” modifying the phrase 
“disposable income,” are the key tools. BAPCPA did not take those 
away.109 
 
 
or below the median income, parties must determine “projected disposable income” by looking at 
Schedule I to determine the debtor’s income at the date the petition was filed.”); Kibbe, 342 B.R. at 
415 (“In a below median case, ‘projected disposable income,’ as used in section 1325(b)(1)(B), is 
based on a debtor’s current income and expenses as reflected on Schedules I and J.”); Hardacre, 338 
B.R. at 722 (“The court believes that the term “projected disposable income” must be based upon the 
debtor’s anticipated income during the term of the plan, not merely an average of her prepetition 
income.”).  
 106. See, e.g., In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 299 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007) (“[T]he language of Section 
1325(b)(3) is only a further definition of ‘disposable income’ in the case of above-median debtors, and 
thus only contributes to the establishment of the presumptive ‘disposable income’ calculation.”); In re 
LaSota, 351 B.R. 56 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that “frugal” above-median debtors whose 
actual expenses fell below the IRS standard allowances could not retain the excess without paying 
their creditors in full); Edmunds, 350 B.R. at 644 (finding “that the expense allowance provided by 
§ 1325(b)(3) is a forward-looking concept and is not strictly determined by the mathematical 
calculation of Form B22C”); In re Gress, 344 B.R. 919, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) (holding that, 
because “Form B22C serves merely as a starting point,” debtors could not confirm a plan based on 
their Form B22C disposable income of $81.56 per month while the disposable income revealed by 
Schedules I & J equaled $2,182.17); In re McGuire, 342 B.R. 608, 615 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) 
(“[T]he Form B22C disposable income calculation is merely a starting point, not a determinative 
number.”); In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411, 418 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (presuming “that the number resulting 
from Form B22C is the debtor’s ‘projected disposable income’ unless the debtor can show that there 
has been a substantial change in circumstances such that the numbers contained in Form B22C are not 
commensurate with a fair projection of the debtor’s budget in the future”).  
 107. See supra note 29 for the text of § 1325(a)(3).  
 108. See, e.g., In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849, 867 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2007) (holding that “strict and 
technical compliance with [§ 1325(b)] does not necessarily satisfy any debtors’ burden of good faith”); 
Edmunds, 350 B.R. at 648 (“This Court finds that the strict mechanical application of the Means Test 
does not necessarily satisfy Debtors’ burden of demonstrating good faith in the proposal of their plans, 
including whether they are devoting sufficient income to their plan.”).  
 109. 351 B.R. at 61.  
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2. The Strict Textualist Approach  
Courts applying a liberal construction to the Code reject plans that 
depart drastically from pre-BAPCPA practice by leaving money in 
debtors’ pockets at the expense of creditors. Other courts, however, 
construe § 1325(b) strictly and are thereby willing to confirm the very 
same plans. While these strict textualist courts may be willing to allow 
such results, they often do so grudgingly and are quick to point out the 
apparent irony of their holdings. Such frustration is palpable in statements 
like the following from the court in In re Rotunda:  
To allow a debtor with income above the state median to provide 
for zero payments to unsecured creditors in a chapter 13 plan based 
on the calculations on Form B22C when, according to Schedules I 
and J, there remains sufficient funds to pay even a minimal dividend 
to them, is contrary to the approach taken by this Court for over 20 
years in considering chapter 13 plans. Yet . . . it is not for the Court 
to second guess Congress despite the fact that the statute, as written, 
may result in a confirmed plan that is contrary to the view expressed 
by President Bush . . . .110 
Notwithstanding such sentiments of consternation or surprise, strict 
textualist courts have been willing to confirm zero-payment plans because 
they find the plain meaning of the statute compels but one result. These 
courts argue that the word “shall” in § 1325(b)(3)111 leaves no discretion 
to the bankruptcy bench, making means test expenses and six-month pre-
petition income the beginning and the end of a court’s inquiry into 
projected disposable income.112 Furthermore, they argue that Congress 
 
 
 110. 349 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006). The court later declared that “[i]f this was not 
Congress’ intent, then it is up to Congress to rectify the situation.” Id. at 332. See also In re Guzman, 
345 B.R. 640, 646 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (noting that although § 1325(b)(3) may “not perform as 
advertised,” causing trustees, unsecured creditors, and some judges to “long for the ‘good old days’”  
of reviewing Schedules I and J to determine reasonable and necessary expenses, “the mandate of new 
§ 1325(b)(3) is clear”); In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 750 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (“To veterans of 
Chapter 13 practice, it runs afoul of basic principles to suggest that a debtor with no disposable income 
can nonetheless propose a confirmable plan. Yet BACPA permits precisely that.”).  
 111. “Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended . . . shall be determined in accordance with 
[the means test].” § 1325(b)(3) (emphasis added).  
 112. See, e.g., In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 224, 228–29 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Although 
context may sometimes suggest otherwise, ‘shall’ typically means ‘must.’ . . . For an above-median 
debtor, then, expenses must be calculated under section 707(b)(2); what the debtor lists as expenses on 
his Schedule J, outrageous or not, is beside the point.”); Guzman, 345 B.R. at 645 (use of the word 
“shall” in § 1325(b)(3) “removes all discretion from the bankruptcy court in reviewing the 
reasonableness of the expenses claimed by the above-median debtor”); In re Barr, 341 B.R. 181, 185 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006) (“The use of ‘shall’ in section 1325(b)(3) is mandatory and leaves no 
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deliberately sought to limit judicial discretion and that courts are bound to 
apply the law as written, even in the face of surprising results.113 
Armed with this strict reading of the statute and their own take on 
Congressional intent, the strict textualist courts confront the arguments 
advanced by courts advocating a more liberal construction. First, strict 
textualists are quick to question the proposition that the word “projected” 
in § 1325(b)(1)(B) permits the continued usage of Schedules I and J over 
the historical data and means test figures reported on Form B22C.114 The 
court in In re Hanks attacked this approach by finding that such reliance 
on the word “projected” requires “the unjustifiable deletion of several 
pages of the Bankruptcy Code in the name of a single word.”115 The court 
explained, 
[E]ven if the word “projected” needs to be given meaning in the 
abstract to avoid it being mere surplusage, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that the “preference for avoiding surplusage 
constructions is not absolute” and can be “offset by the canon that 
permits a court to reject words as surplusage if inadvertently 
inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute.” . . . [O]ne word 
clearly should not be elevated in importance so as to gut an entire 
statutory scheme enacted by Congress.116  
Many of the strict textualist courts have also criticized the liberal 
courts’ argument that the good faith test can override a plan which 
 
 
discretion with respect to the expenses and deductions that are to be deducted in arriving at disposable 
income.”).  
 113. See, e.g., In re Kolb, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 993, at ∗22–23 (“The statutory language selected 
by the drafters indicates that Congress deliberately preferred these defined immutable expenses . . . . 
Where Congress wanted to provide any discretion, the statutory language provides for this discretion 
explicitly, unambiguously, and with defined conditions.”); In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494, 502 (Bankr. D. 
Utah 2007) (“It bears repeating that Congress’ function is to legislate while the Court’s function is to 
interpret and apply the law as written instead of a law that the Court might find more logical or 
reasonable.”); Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. at 229 (holding that using Schedule J “would undo what 
Congress sought to accomplish in section 1325(b)(3),” and stating that “[a]lthough the trustee finds 
this new regime distasteful, Congress evidently knew what it was doing”); Barr, 341 B.R. at 185 
(claiming that Congress was quite aware that § 1325(b)(3) would require utilizing expenses “that 
might differ markedly from the debtor’s actual expenses,” and, therefore, did not believe that “the 
result in this case of applying section 1325(b)(3) as written can be rejected as being absurd”).  
 114. See, e.g., In re Miller, 361 B.R. 224, 235 (“Those courts that argue Congress intended 
something more when it referred to ‘projected disposable income’ in § 1325(b)(1)(B) fail to address 
the fact that Congress defined ‘disposable income’ subsequently in § 1325(b)(2).”); accord Rotunda, 
349 B.R. at 331. 
 115. 362 B.R. at 499. 
 116. Id.  
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otherwise conforms to § 1325(b)(1)(B).117 The court in In re Alexander 
pointed out that, even if a debtor’s plan differs from what would have been 
required before BAPCPA, the debtor “is simply complying with the new 
law,” which is not bad faith.118 In summarizing the duty of bankruptcy 
courts in the post-BAPCPA era (and simultaneously denouncing the 
liberal approach to the new Code), Alexander went on to declare that the 
courts’ “job is to interpret the new statute as clearly written, not to 
nostalgically preserve the past by seizing on isolated words such as ‘good 
faith’ and ‘projected’ and inflating their meaning beyond justification.”119 
Finally, in rejecting the liberal construction and applying § 1325(b) 
strictly, some courts have estimated that the unrealistic120 product of post-
BAPCPA calculations is not necessarily much worse than the pre-
BAPCPA result from Schedules I and J. The Rotunda court pointed out 
that one’s circumstances rarely stay exactly the same from month to 
month—for example, expenses for telephone, electricity, insurance 
premiums, and taxes are all subject to change.121 Therefore, “projecting 
disposable income based on an average of six months’ income after certain 
standard deductions and payment on secured and priority debt is no less 
realistic than the figures used in Schedules I and J for purposes of 
proposing a feasible plan.”122 
 
 
 117. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
 118. In re Alexander, 344 B.R 742, 752 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). The court added, “So long as the 
debtor calculates the projected disposable income with specific reference to the new definition of 
disposable income and commits that projected disposable income to pay unsecured creditors for the 
applicable commitment period, she is in good faith compliance with the Code.” Id. See also Farrar-
Johnson, 353 B.R. at 232 (“The disposable income a debtor decides to commit to his plan is not the 
measure of his good faith in proposing the plan.”); Barr, 341 B.R. at 186 (“[W]ith an above-median-
income Chapter 13 debtor, the debtor’s ability to pay and whether the proposed plan commits all of the 
debtor’s disposable income must be determined under section 1325(b) rather than as an element of 
good faith under section 1325(a)(3).”).  
 119. Alexander, 344 B.R. at 752.  
 120. See, e.g., In re Gress, 344 B.R. 919, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) (noting that the use of the 
means test under § 1325(b)(3) “allows debtors to propose plan payments based on a sort of parallel 
universe, which sometimes has little or nothing to do with their actual situation”).  
 121. 349 B.R. at 331.  
 122. Id. Another court noted that the Form B22C calculations are not really “different than what 
courts used to do in pre-BAPCPA practice except that courts previously calculated the plan return 
using the average, estimated, and fluid numbers in Schedules I and J rather than the average, 
estimated, and partially standardized numbers in Form B22C. And neither method is particularly 
realistic.” In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494, 499 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The “rough justice” that the LaSota court and others seek to fashion is 
motivated by good intentions and is informed by pragmatism. It is 
unfortunate that the BAPCPA amendments have clipped these courts’ 
wings, replacing their careful considerations with inanimate math. It is 
also unfortunate that the liberal interpretation of § 1325(b) is unsupported 
by the law. The strict textualists’ construction of § 1325(b) is the correct 
reading of the current Code.  
Courts of both the liberal and strict textual camps reference the 
supposed intent of BAPCPA’s drafters in the course of their respective 
interpretations.123 However, the Supreme Court has recently cautioned 
against utilizing extra-textual sources: “[W]hen the statute’s language is 
plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition 
required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its 
terms.”124 The Court has further instructed that a statute is only “absurd” if 
the outcome resulting from its application is “demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters.”125 Generally speaking, proving sufficient 
absurdity for the purpose of a statutory override is extremely difficult; the 
Supreme Court has been openly hostile to such arguments.126 It has also 
expressed a strong bias against employing legislative histories for any 
interpretation effort, whether as a precursor to an absurdity argument or 
otherwise:  
As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the 
statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic 
material. . . . [L]egislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, 
 
 
 123. See supra notes 97, 112.  
 124. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 125. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).  
 126. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003) (detailing the 
Court’s recent animus towards the “absurdity doctrine” and discussing conceptual difficulties with the 
approach). One commentator has offered this useful advice on the subject:  
The Supreme Court lectern is littered with the remains of advocates who have constructed 
seemingly air-tight arguments as to why Congress could not possibly have intended a 
particular result only to have those arguments thrashed by skeptical Justices, who question the 
ability of any onlooker to know what Congress really intended. To have any prospect for 
success under this approach, the party must point to something very concrete. The best case 
for a textual override is that the statute is unworkable or dysfunctional if read in accordance 
with its literal terms, or that it is irrational to the point of absurdity and Congress did not 
intend for absurd results. To trump text, the degree of irrationality must be severe.  
Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text In An Age Of Textualism: A Practitioner’s Guide To Arguing 
Cases Of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451, 472 (2002).  
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and contradictory. Judicial investigation of legislative history has a 
tendency to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal's memorable 
phrase, an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your 
friends.’”127 
Therefore, any effort to utilize the long and stormy history of BAPCPA 
in attempting to understand § 1325(b) is inadvisable. Even if it were 
prudent to consult BAPCPA’s legislative biography, the venture would be 
fraught with difficulty. As one court noted, “[t]o the extent legislative 
history of the 2005 Act can be used to resolve any arguable ambiguity in 
the statutory language, it is of dubious assistance.”128 This is because 
BAPCPA sorely lacks the kind of reporting and debate which usually 
attends similar legislative efforts.129 Even to the extent that anything can 
be gleaned from the history of the Act, the “conflicting policies” therein 
revealed would “not provide a useful guide for interpreting the phrase 
‘projected disposable income’ in § 1325(b)(1)(B).”130 For instance, some 
would assert that the § 1325(b)(1)(B) best efforts test seeks to ensure that 
debtors pay as much as possible to creditors over the course of a Chapter 
13 plan;131 BAPCPA generally appears to further such a goal. But, as 
noted by the Hanks court, other motivations are evident in BAPCPA as 
well: for instance, the Act makes numerous items deductible from 
disposable income which, all together, “do not appear to further a goal of 
maximum repayment to all creditors.”132 
 
 
 127. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).  
 128. In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). See also Lundin, supra note 6 at 71 
(“[Practitioners should r]esist the temptation to jump from reading the words to divining intent. Sure 
there is legislative history . . . . But much was lost, much changed and much was added in the 
translation of rhetoric into BAPCPA.”) 
 129. The Sorrell court explained,  
First, there is no joint conference statement because the 2005 Act did not have a conference 
committee. A conference report is generally the best source of legislative history. Similarly, 
unlike the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, no report of the floor managers exists which might be 
given the weight of a conference committee report. The versions of the 2005 Act passed by 
the Senate and House of Representatives were identical and a conference committee was not 
required. Even assuming it is appropriate to consider the House Judiciary Report (which 
represents only a view of members of one committee of one house of the federal bicameral 
legislature) as a source of legislative history, it often contains a mere recitation of the 
eventually enacted statutory text and adds little, if any, assistance to the court’s efforts in 
determining Congress’s intent. 
359 B.R. at 176 (citations omitted). 
 130. See In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494, 502 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007).  
 131. Id. at 500 (citing In re Fuller, 346 B.R. 472, 483 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006)).  
 132. Id. See also Sorrell, 359 B.R. at 177 (noting that the phrase “those who can pay, should pay” 
is used often in reported decisions, and “is often offered . . . as a basis to disregard the actual language 
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Putting aside for the moment the intentionalist approach as being 
disfavored by the Supreme Court (and as being a rather blunt instrument 
when applied to BAPCPA’s opaque history), our analysis must turn to the 
language of the statute itself. As explained in Part II-B-1, supra, courts 
attempting to achieve equitable outcomes under the new Code principally 
focus on the word “projected” in § 1325(b)(1)(B), claiming that it 
demonstrates Congress intended courts to look into the future and not to 
rely on the historical and static figures incorporated by §§ 1325(b)(2), 
(3).133 In so holding, these courts appear to be motivated by the perception 
that a strict reading leads to untenable results.134 However, as a rule, even 
“harsh” or “awkward” results which follow from a given application of a 
statute will not be sufficient to override an interpretation which is 
otherwise commanded by its text.135 The correct interpretation of 
§ 1325(b) is that the phrases “projected disposable income” and 
“disposable income” as used therein are synonyms, and that both are 
controlled by the strict definition of disposable income in § 1325(b)(2). 
Section 1325 is a lengthy provision of the Code. But in all of its 1,243 
words, the words “disposable” and “income” appear together exactly 
twice: once in § 1325(b)(1)(B) as “projected disposable income,” and once 
in § 1325(b)(2) as “disposable income.”136 Therefore, the definition of 
disposable income in § 1325(b)(2) must be exclusively designed to control 
§ 1325(b)(1)(B), since § 1325(b)(1)(B) is the only other location of the 
phrase. As recognized by the Alexander court, “If ‘disposable income’ is 
not linked to ‘projected disposable income’ then it is just a floating 
definition with no apparent purpose.”137 To put it another way, if the word 
“projected” in § 1325(b)(1)(B) is capable of singularly redefining 
 
 
of the enacted legislation,” but “neither this (nor any similar) phrase appears in the text of the 2005 
Act”).   
 133. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 135. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (what may 
appear to be an “unintentional drafting gap” does not necessarily authorize judicial correction; even if 
an omission seems “odd,” if it is not “absurd” then “it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix 
it”); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (“Although we recognize the potential for harsh 
results in some cases, we are not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted.”); Lamie v. 
United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 533 (2004) (an “awkward, and even ungrammatical” statute may 
not necessarily be “ambiguous” enough to warrant judicial tinkering).  
 136. Section 1325(b)(1)(B) mandates that “all of the debtor’s projected disposable income” be 
paid to unsecured creditors (emphasis added). Thereafter, § 1325(b)(2) states that, “For purposes of 
this subsection, the term ‘disposable income’ means current monthly income . . . less amounts 
reasonably necessary to be expended . . . .” (emphasis added). In turn, § 1325(b)(3) defines “amounts 
reasonably necessary to be expended” in § 1325(b)(2) as means test expenses for above-median 
debtors. 
 137. 344 B.R. at 749.  
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disposable income, then what is the purpose of the definition in 
§ 1325(b)(2)? The liberal courts’ preoccupation with the word “projected” 
would render the § 1325(b)(2) definition superfluous.  
Even if we do not know what BAPCPA’s drafters intended to occur in 
case-by-case applications of § 1325(b), we do know that they intentionally 
altered the definitions of income138 and expenses139 under that subsection. 
In other words, by enacting BAPCPA, we know Congress meant to fire a 
gun, even if we do not know what it meant to hit. The irony of the liberal 
approach is that, while claiming to adhere to legislative purpose,140 it 
effectively nullifies it. The liberal approach elevates the word “projected” 
in a way that allows bankruptcy courts to pass over BAPCPA’s new 
formulae in favor of the same nuanced methods practiced prior to the 2005 
Act.141 This interpretation of the Code leads to the unlikely conclusion 
that, in spite of deliberately changing the definition of disposable income, 
Congress in fact meant for it to stay the same.142 In fretting over whether 
Congress’s target is struck, liberal courts opt instead to just disarm the 
gun.  
Another problem with the liberal construction is that it wrongfully 
assumes Congress intentionally included the word “projected” in 
§ 1325(b)(1)(B) and intentionally excluded it from § 1325(b)(2).143 The 
phrases “projected disposable income” and “disposable income” existed in 
§§ 1325(b)(1)(B), (b)(2) prior to the 2005 Act.144 However, with the 
formerly exclusive use of Schedules I and J to determine disposable 
income,145 and absent the historical figures now incorporated by 
BAPCPA, the two phrases meant substantially the same thing.146 In other 
 
 
 138. Under § 1325(b)(2), “income” was redefined as “current monthly income.” See supra note 61 
and accompanying text.  
 139. Congress did so by referencing means test expenses for above-median debtors. See supra 
note 65 and accompanying text.  
 140. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 141. Generally, courts adopting the liberal approach outlined in Part II.B.1, supra, read the Code 
in a way that resurrects the prior exclusive reliance on Schedules I and J.  
 142. Congress’s intent would thus have been for Schedules I and J to continue to be determinative 
instead of the new measurements of income and expenses now reported on Form B22C per BAPCPA. 
 143. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for cases which find meaning in this supposedly 
deliberate asymmetry.  
 144. See supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text.  
 145. See supra note 35.  
 146. See, e.g., In re LaSota, 351 B.R. 56, 60 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006) (“BAPCPA displaced the 
earlier view that ‘projected disposable income’ is indistinguishable from what, in common parlance, is 
‘excess post-petition income.’ When Schedules I and J were the primary source of data, the two terms 
were synonymous.”); In re Kolb, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 993, at *15 (“‘Disposable income,’ as defined in 
§ 1325(b)(2), was typically applied directly as ‘projected disposable income’ over the term of a 
chapter 13 plan pursuant to § 1325(b)(1)(B).”); In re Brady, 361 B.R. 765, 769 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) 
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words, since both the definition of “disposable income” and the 
application of “projected disposable income” considered a debtor’s present 
and future actual expenses, there was no practical difference in the 
phrases. The difference, if any, lay dormant.  
Moreover, according to some commentators, bankruptcy judges and 
practitioners were locked out of BAPCPA’s drafting process,147 leaving its 
authorship in the hands of lobbyists. It is therefore doubtful that the 
architects of the new § 1325(b) realized the amendments would stir this 
latent textual conflict from its slumber. If the asymmetrical phrasing is 
intentional, it is according to the design of the drafters of the 1984 
amendments (which added § 1325(b)(1)(B)),148 not the drafters of 
BAPCPA. To the extent that the authors of the 2005 Act gave any thought 
to the phrasing at all, they probably assumed the unity of definition 
practiced before the amendments would continue. In fact, there is some 
direct evidence supporting this assumption elsewhere in the Act. Section 
321(c)(1) of BAPCPA added § 1129(a)(15)(B) to Chapter 11, which states 
in pertinent part: 
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if . . . (15) In a case in which 
the debtor is an individual and in which the holder of an allowed 
unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan . . . (B) the 
value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not less than 
the projected disposable income of the debtor (as defined in section 
1325(b)(2)) to be received . . . .149  
This subsection indicates that § 1325(b)(2) defines “projected 
disposable income.” Of course, § 1325(b)(2) does not actually do this: it 
 
 
(“Under prior practice, the court would simply utilize the debtors’ income and reasonable expenses as 
listed on Schedules I and J to determine the debtors’ disposable income.”).  
 147. One commentator fumes,  
In contrast to the 1978 legislation, which was crafted with extensive assistance from many of 
the finest minds in the bankruptcy world, many of the consumer provisions of the 2005 
legislation were largely drafted by lobbyists with limited knowledge of real-life consumer 
bankruptcy practice. It is perhaps a credit to the bankruptcy bar that no true expert in 
bankruptcy participated in drafting the consumer provisions sought by the financial services 
industry; apparently the industry did not trust any experienced bankruptcy attorneys, even 
creditor attorneys, to carry out its mission of defacing the Code. Or perhaps it is just an 
indication of the arrogance of the bill’s drafters, who throughout the legislative process 
steadfastly resisted even the smallest technical corrections to their handiwork. 
Sommer, supra note 5, at 191–92. See also Lundin, supra note 6, at 70 (“Especially the consumer 
parts, this legislation was not written or vetted by the practitioners and scholars usually involved in 
bankruptcy legislative efforts.”).   
 148. See supra note 33.  
 149. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(15)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).  
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merely defines “disposable income.” Indeed, the absence of the word 
“projected” in § 1325(b)(2) is exactly what has spawned the controversy 
examined by this Note. This passage from § 1129(a)(15)(B) (which was 
created from scratch by BAPCPA) suggests either that Congress intended 
the phrases “projected disposable income” and “disposable income” to be 
synonymous, or that BAPCPA’s drafters were ignorant of the 
difference.150 Either way, § 1129(a)(15)(B) critically undermines the idea 
that the asymmetrical appearance of the word “projected” is meaningful 
and was meant to alter the given definition of disposable income.  
The remaining justifications employed by the liberal approach—such 
as reliance on the good faith test of § 1325(a)(3)151 or the adoption of a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of Form B22C disposable income152—are 
particularly weak and fail to overcome the conclusion that the new best 
efforts test must be read strictly.  
One overarching theme of BAPCPA was the replacement of judicial 
discretion with cold, hard math.153 This is precisely what occurred in 
§ 1325(b). Using the good faith test to justify overriding a debtor’s plan 
proposal and requiring that the debtor conform to pre-BAPCPA practice 
appears to be little more than an end run around BAPCPA’s black letter 
mandate. In any case, it is certainly unfair to penalize a debtor for 
complying with the new, more rigid and formulaic Code. Such compliance 
is not bad faith.154  
As for the notion that means test expenses under § 1325(b)(3) should 
only be used as a “starting point”155 for determining a debtor’s expenses, 
the idea that Congress intended its legislation to merely serve as a 
rebuttable presumption is wholly unsupported by the text of the statute and 
its history. In practice, such a “presumption” will likely be “rebutted” 
whenever the court prefers a result other than that which is produced by 
BAPCPA’s math. Like the improper use of the good faith test, this 
tortured reading appears to be less of a construction of the new law than it 
is an evasion of BAPCPA’s intended effect.  
 
 
 150. This curious inconsistency was also picked up by the court in Kolb, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 993, 
at *33 n.18.  
 151. See supra note 108 for cases utilizing the good faith test in this way.  
 152. See supra note 106 for examples of the “rebuttable presumption” standard.  
 153. See supra note 43.  
 154. See supra note 118 for cases in accord.  
 155. See, e.g., In re Gress, 344 B.R. 919, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re McGuire, 342 B.R. 
608, 615 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006).  
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It is self-evident that the use of historical data156 and static, third-party 
assessments of reasonable expenses157 will produce a financial profile that 
frequently differs from a person’s true, present circumstances. This new 
measurement of disposable income will naturally be sometimes lower and 
sometimes higher than before. Therefore, it should be rather unsurprising 
that BAPCPA’s revision to § 1325(b) often produces “harsh” results—
such as when creditors are confronted with debtors who withhold more 
than their actual expenses, or when debtors cannot confirm plans without 
committing more income than they have to give. Because these results are 
so predictable, it cannot be said that they are absurd enough to warrant 
taking a blue pencil to the Code.158 While the efforts of courts undertaking 
a liberal approach may be grounded in sound moral authority and may be 
animated by a sincere desire to do justice, such efforts are, unfortunately, 
unsupported by the law. Unless Congress amends the amendment, 
bankruptcy courts must follow the strict textualist construction of 
§ 1325(b).  
For those on the bankruptcy bench who feel slighted by BAPCPA’s 
curtailing of discretion, and for those who resent the purported railroading 
of the Act by the consumer credit lobby, the strict textualist approach 
offers some opportunities for satisfaction. For instance, confirming plans 
which reduce payments to unsecured creditors may be a gratifying way to 
throw the law back at its “drafters.” However, even for those subscribing 
to such a viewpoint, it must be remembered that the blade cuts both ways: 
the strict textualist reading of the Code sometimes causes debtors to be 
effectively foreclosed from relief because they are unable to propose 
conforming plans.159 In order to ensure the just treatment of debtors and 
creditors alike, it is imperative that the law be fixed.  
 
 
 156. I.e., the new historically-rooted definition of “current monthly income” according to 
§§ 101(10A), 1325(b)(3).  
 157. I.e., the incorporation of IRS tables via the means test as referenced by § 1325(b)(3) for 
above-median debtors.  
 158. This position is contrary to the assertions of some courts that such absurdity does in fact 
follow from a strict reading of § 1325(b). See, e.g., In re LaSota, 351 B.R. 56, 60 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
2006); In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411, 418 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006).  
 159. For example, debtors who experience a sharp drop in income before filing would be unable 
to confirm a plan which did not propose to pay out at levels according to their six-month pre-petition 
average income. See supra note 90. This might mean that they cannot realistically propose any plan at 
all because the only plan they can confirm is one they can no longer afford (or they will at least have to 
wait until their rolling average income shrinks over time to match their “actual” current income).  
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IV. PROPOSAL 
As a starting proposition, I cannot resist suggesting that BAPCPA 
section 102(h) (the portion of the 2005 Act affecting § 1325(b))160 be 
repealed in its entirety, returning the best efforts test to an examination of 
a debtor’s actual disposable income per Schedules I and J, subject to a 
judicial review for reasonableness. While the strict textualist courts 
correctly interpret § 1325(b), the equitable results achieved by those 
applying a liberal reading are nonetheless preferable. The pre-BAPCPA 
best efforts test appears to have been well-suited to give the bankruptcy 
bench sufficient means to administer the “rough justice” (for debtors and 
creditors alike) contemplated by the LaSota court.161 However, out of 
respect for the legislative judgment that stricter controls such as the means 
test are in fact desirable and necessary, I ultimately propose a statutory 
solution which should preserve the thrust of the initial amendment while 
avoiding confusion and achieving more just results.  
First: The word “projected” should be deleted from § 1325(b)(1)(B), 
thereby clarifying that the definition of disposable income in § 1325(b)(2) 
controls the phrase “disposable income” in § 1325(b)(1)(B).162 Because 
the phrase “to be received” immediately follows “disposable income” in § 
1325(b)(1)(B), it should remain clear that disposable income is oriented in 
the future even after deleting the modifier, “projected.”  
Second: The phrase “current monthly income” in § 1325(b)(2) should 
be changed to “projected monthly income,” removing any reference to 
§ 101(10A)—which defines “current monthly income” as a debtor’s six-
month pre-petition average income.163 When the § 707(b) means test is 
 
 
 160. See supra note 59.  
 161. See supra text accompanying note 109.  
 162. Section 1325(b)(1) would then read,  
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the 
plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan (A) 
the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less 
than the amount of such claim; or (B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s disposable 
income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first 
payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under 
the plan. 
 163. The words “to be” should be added immediately thereafter for grammatical correctness. 
Section 1325(b)(2) would then read,  
For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘disposable income’ means projected monthly 
income to be received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, 
or disability payments for a dependent child made in accordance with applicable 
nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less 
amounts reasonably necessary to be expended . . . . 
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used as a checkpoint to preclude debtors from filing for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy,164 the § 101(10A) definition of current monthly income 
employed therein makes sense. In trying to size up a debtor to determine 
whether she is presently worthy of liquidation bankruptcy, historical data 
are the best objective indicators of where she stands. Furthermore, the 
consequences of the means test in the Chapter 7 context are not fatal—the 
debtor may still proceed with a Chapter 13 plan even if the debtor “flunks” 
the means test.165 But in Chapter 13, where the role of the court, trustee, 
debtor, and creditors is to look years into the future in order to craft a 
payment plan that best serves everyone’s needs, a focus on the past is 
inappropriate and counterproductive. It is essential that plan calculations 
be based on a debtor’s actual, anticipated income in order for the plan to 
be realistic and successful. Furthermore, for a debtor who is foreclosed 
from Chapter 7 by the means test, the consequence of flunking the Chapter 
13 plan confirmation166 may be fatal, making bankruptcy relief completely 
unavailable for an essentially arbitrary reason. Therefore, the phrase 
“projected monthly income” must be employed to cause courts to consider 
Schedule I (and any other facts, as appropriate) in assessing future income.  
Third: The phrase “shall be determined in accordance with [the means 
test]” in § 1325(b)(3) should be changed to “shall not exceed amounts 
determined in accordance with [the means test].”167 The effect of this 
change will be to turn means test expenses into a cap for above-median 
debtors instead of a deduction which these debtors may claim as a matter 
of right. This will prevent frugal debtors from withholding the difference 
between their actual expenses and the means test expenses.168 The reason 
Congress incorporated means test expenses into § 1325(b) was probably to 
utilize their capping effect, thereby preventing wealthier debtors from 
maintaining the luxurious “necessities” they enjoyed up until filing their 
bankruptcy petition. It probably did not occur to BAPCPA’s drafters that 
 
 
 164. See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text for more on the means test generally and as it 
is applied to Chapter 7 petitioners.  
 165. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
 166. For example, by no longer earning the kind of income shown by her § 101(10A) historical 
average. See supra note 90 for cases representing such an effect.  
 167. Section 1325(b)(3) would then read, “Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under 
paragraph (2), other than subparagraph (A)(ii) of paragraph (2), shall not exceed amounts determined 
in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current monthly 
income, when multiplied by 12, greater than . . . [the applicable median].”  
 168. See supra notes 88, 89 and accompanying text for an example of this. Note that for those 
debtors who happen to have expenses which exceed means test expenses and which are in fact 
necessary (e.g., healthcare expenses, extraordinary work commute), the means test already makes 
allowances for this. See, e.g., §§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), (V).  
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in those cases where means test expenses actually exceed a debtor’s needs, 
§ 707(b) might be relied on as a shield in order to withhold more income 
from creditors than is necessary. My proposed change to § 1325(b)(3) 
preserves the probable intent of the amendment (capping expenses) while 
preventing confusion and injustice.169  
These three changes working in concert will eradicate much of the 
uncertainty and injustice that has swirled around post-BAPCPA § 1325(b). 
The definition of disposable income will be clarified, actual projected 
income will be considered (which will ensure greater plan feasibility, 
benefiting all), and means test expenses may still be used to hem in the 
lifestyles of wealthy petitioners—but without being used as a weapon by 
frugal debtors or others attempting to game the system.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the sprawling nature of the BAPCPA amendments and the 
underlying complexity of the Bankruptcy Code, it should come as no 
surprise that inconsistencies and confusion have surfaced as the Act has 
been applied. But to the extent the new § 1325(b) has produced results 
which are surprising, ironic, or even harsh, such results are an entirely 
predictable consequence of delimiting the lifestyle choices of real people 
through a strict calculus of averages and historical data. They are not 
“absurd” results, however, and therefore may not be overcome by anything 
short of a legislative response. While the merits and necessity of BAPCPA 
may be vigorously debated, the legislature has already spoken on behalf of 
its constituents, and its judgment deserves deference. BAPCPA and the 
various cold calculations it calls for must be respected. However, several 
technical amendments are required in order to remove confusion and to 
more properly effect the Act’s purpose. To this end, my proposed 
amendments should restore a measure of harmony to the Chapter 13 plan 
confirmation practice. But until this solution is implemented, courts are 
left with no choice but to strictly apply the law as written and to stomach 
the results which follow—even when they are harsh.  
Jeffrey R. Drobish*
 
 
 169. The phenomenon of “double dipping” should also be cured by this construction. See supra 
note 90. As means test expenses will no longer be claimable by debtors as a matter of right, but will 
serve merely as a cap, a debtor should have no sound argument to make for including § 707(b) 
expenses which are not actually incurred.  
 * J.D. Candidate (2008), Washington University School of Law. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/5
